Introduction
In early December, 1778, patriot soldiers from Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia arrived at the southern foothills of New Jersey's Watchung Mountains and began erecting a log-hut winter encampment near Middlebrook. Through the following June, the Middlebrook encampment housed some 6,000 men, making it the largest concentration of troops in General sources of forage, and the local landscape appealed to Greene; he described the region as "plentiful country, naturally strong and difficult to access and surrounded with a great plenty of wood."
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The latter article was particularly necessary for an army envisioning the construction of log huts for winter shelter, as it had done a year earlier at Valley Forge.
In Greene's formulation for winter quarters, logistical concerns trumped defensibility.
Compared to provision and forage, he asserted to Washington that other considerations remained "inferior evils," which "may in some sort be remedied, by foresight and precaution; but there is no of the army's forage in regards to whether it could sustain a potential offensive. He declared that the 12,000 men then under arms would need "to be fed with provisions transported at a great distance. The teams requisite for this purpose will consume a great quantity of forage." To maintain the army's supplies, he estimated "upwards of 5,000 horses to be fed that are necessary to move the army." Additional animal teams conducting routine camp activities also drew forage.
Biddle did not believe forage existed in great enough quantities to sustain such an operation, declaring "it may be attended with destructive consequences," to entertain an offensive against New York without proper forage supplies.
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In Biddle's estimation, New Jersey could barely sustain the Main Army in its current position on the Hudson, and the army's animal teams' forage needs bore responsibility for this distress. Throughout the late summer and fall, teams had hauled supplies from the south and west defensive priority, but the Hudson Valley lay at too great a distance from the army's primary supply sources to make for a viable winter position for the majority of the force.
Conclusion: The Morristown Winter and After
In contrast to the army's experience at Valley Forge, the Continentals spent the winter at Overall, the course of the war proved correct Washington's decision to quarter the bulk of his forces in northern New Jersey after 1778. While his men did suffer through supply shortages, particularly in 1780, these problems arose due to currency depreciation and snowfalls that blocked roads leading to camp, not from a shortage of forage or immobilized supply trains. 69 Soldiers enjoyed healthier conditions within camp due to the placement of their huts on well-drained hillsides, while abundant local timber supplies ensured adequate construction material. In contrast to the logistical advantages the New Jersey environment provided, the state's defensibility endured only limited tests. Britain's New York garrison remained docile through 1778-1779, leaving the
